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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines and interprets how royalty is structured by combining the fixed 
royalty component and the running royalty component, utilizing the U.S.-Japan patent licensing 
data.  Risk sharing theory predicts that the increase of risk (implied by more forward citations 
to a licensed patent) will favor the use of running royalty rather than simple fixed royalty to 
share the risk.  The principal and agent framework predicts that, if a licensee has greater scope 
of entrepreneurial effort (as well as of moral hazard) than a licensor, it will favor fixed royalty.  
The same framework also predicts that, if a licensor has a margin of moral hazard, it will favor 
running royalty.  Thus, as long as transaction cost (TC) is neglected, theoretical predictions 
critically depend on the ad hoc assumptions of risk aversion, the scope of entrepreneurial effort, 
and of moral hazard.  Instead of this TC-free argument, this paper follows prior studies in 
agriculture and in movie film, which recognize the importance of measurement cost.  While 
running royalty is computed from royalty base, i.e., sales of final products, a patent with larger 
number of citing patents has a more diversified royalty base, which is more costly to specify and 
measure.  As the scope of the royalty base becomes more complex, it is more costly to 
determine whether or not those products based on citing patents infringe the originating patent.  
Thus, running royalty is expected to incur more costs to measure royalty base, as the number of 
citing patents increase.  The efficiency gain from share contracting will be eventually 
overridden by the increase in measurement cost.  The empirical evidence indeed shows that 
running royalty is less frequently used when there are more citing patents (forward citations) to 
licensed patents.  The finding is consistent with the interpretation that measurement cost 
matters in share contracts of technology licensing.   
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1. Introduction  
Running royalty is said to be the most typical form of royalty in technology 
licensing (McGavock, Haas, and Patin 1993).  Running royalty is a royalty scheme which is 
derived from a royalty rate (percentage rate or dollar amount) applied to a royalty base (dollar 
of sales, or units sold of final products, in realized terms), and therefore belongs to the family 
of share contracts (Smith and Parr, 2000; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995).  An ongoing 
relationship between licensing firms with a need for collaboration and mutual monitoring is 
thus indicated.1  In addition to running royalty, many licensing contracts require a fixed 
amount of initial payment (Smith and Parr, 2000).  Despite theoretical efforts to model share 
contracting (Gallini and Wright 1990; Beggs 1992; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995), 
there are few empirical investigations into how different royalty schemes are structured from 
fixed royalty and running royalty components in technology licensing contracts.  This paper 
empirically examines how royalty is structured by combining the running royalty component 
and the fixed royalty component by utilizing U.S.-Japan patent licensing data2.   
There exist a number of empirical investigations on share contracts, however, in the 
context of sharecropping and franchising.  Among several factors determining royalty types, 
“risk” was first identified and tested, with mixed results (Cheung, 1969; Rao, 1971).  The 
principal-agent framework was then introduced (Stiglitz, 1974) and employed for empirical 
testing.  Findings from the tests supported certain relationships between moral hazard and 
royalty types (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Sen, 1993).  This approach further evolved into 
double-sided moral hazard models (Lafontaine, 1992; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995).  
In the meantime, a rather different approach focusing on measurement cost (Barzel, 1982) 
                                                  
1 Practitioners consider running royalty as a form of deferred payment plan where installments can be 
made over a period of a licensing contract (Martone 1994), and/or as a sign of a "participation by 
licensor in success" (Goldscheider 1994) where "success" is to be realized ex post.  Thus, unlike 
pure fixed royalty, a running royalty contract can be interpreted as one kind of long-term contractual 
arrangement. 
2 Attention is given to unilateral patent licensing only, i.e., cross-licensing or licenses between joint 
venture partners are excluded.   
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was also introduced with empirical supports (Allen and Lueck, 1992, 1993).  The last 
approach does not require ad hoc assumptions of risk-aversion such as in the principal and 
agent models (Allen and Lueck, 1995, 1999).  Measurement cost must not be neglected in 
technology licensing contracts, because the royalty base, e.g., realized sales of specific 
products, should be monitored and measured when running royalty is to be enforced.   
As I will argue later, the number of patent citations (in the sense of forward 
citations) is relevant to the measurement cost of final output.  In short, if a patent has a large 
number of citing patents, it suggests that the originating patent has many applications in final 
products.  While running royalty is computed from royalty base, i.e., sales of final products, 
a patent with larger number of citing patents may have a more diversified royalty base, which 
is more costly to specify and measure.  Assuming that the number of citing patents is 
positively correlated with the cost of measurement, an exploration between citation counts 
and royalty types will shed light on the relationship between measurement cost and share 
contracting in technology licensing, which has not been studied empirically.   
 This paper first reviews existing literature on share contracting, especially 
sharecropping (section 2), and discusses the implications of risk, moral hazard, and 
measurement cost for the choice of royalty types.  The following section (section 3) explains 
an interpretation about the number of forward citations with respect to measurement costs.  
Hypotheses consistent with this interpretation are presented.  Then, the data (section 4) and 
the specifications of econometric tests are explained (section 5), which is followed by results 
and discussion (section 6), and conclusion (section 7).   
 
2. Prior literature on share contracting  
Cheung (1969) first proposed “risk” as a determinant of the choice between 
sharecropping and a fixed-rent contract.  On the one hand, “transaction cost” was claimed to 
be higher in share contracting than in fixed-rent contracting, because of higher costs in 
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negotiation and enforcement, e.g., those costs of specifying the types of crops to be grown, or 
of measuring the actual yield of the crops.  If “transaction cost” is the only consideration, he 
pointed out, “share contracts will never be chosen.”  On the other hand, since risk exists in 
any tenancy and agents are risk-averse, a share contract should always be preferred to 
fixed-rent contract if there is no cost associated with complex share contracting.  He posited 
that the balance be made between risk dispersion and “transaction cost,” in such a way that:  
… since some dispersion of risk is preferred to no dispersion at all, a share 
contract will be chosen … if the higher transaction cost is at least 
compensated for by the gain from risk aversion (Cheung, 1969, p.27).   
According to the inference, share contracts are preferred to fixed-rent contracts when risk is 
high, and when the merit in dispersion of risk exceeds the “transaction cost” of share 
contracting.  Comparative analysis of alternative contractual arrangements is thus introduced, 
where comparison between the gain from risk sharing and “transaction cost” is the underlying 
logic.  However, the notion of “risk” and “transaction cost” was left for further development.   
After Cheung’s pioneering work, follow-up literature mainly focused on elaborating 
the “risk” concept, and on formalizing the notion of asymmetric information in the face of 
risk within the principal and agent framework.  As an initial step, Rao (1971) refuted 
Cheung’s proposition by showing that Indian crops with higher variance in harvest yield 
tended to be grown on cash-rented land than on a crop-shared basis.  Rao (1971) further 
found that fixed-rent contract predominated when the range for decision making by the farmer, 
such as factor substitution, was significant.  The explanation was that fixed-rent leaves more 
entrepreneurial profit for farmers and that efficiency gain is added when there is a wide scope 
of entrepreneurship for farmers, where decision making is hard to be observed by land owners.  
In fact, this explanation was a forerunner of the principal and agent framework (Stiglitz 1974), 
because unobservable efforts made by farmers are the margin for moral hazard behavior, and 
efficiency can be enhanced by increasing residual profit to farmers when the margin is larger.   
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In the following two decades, the models based on the principal and agent 
framework flourished.  A number of papers have tried to analyze how running royalty works 
from this viewpoint.  For example, a line of literature has shown in formal models that 
information asymmetry regarding the value of a licensed patent leads to the use of running 
royalty as a signaling device of its value (Gallini and Wright 1990, Beggs 1992), though 
empirical findings do not clearly support the results of the signaling model (Lafontaine 1993).  
Another body of literature emphasizes the need for supporting effort by a licensor for a 
licensee in explaining the choice of fee types (Lal 1990, in franchising contexts).  In addition 
to the models that assumed private information only in a single actor, double-sided moral 
hazard models were developed and used for empirical tests (Lafontaine, 1992; Bhattacharyya 
and Lafontaine, 1995).  Risk in the sense of uncertainty from external or natural forces is an 
indispensable factor in most of the principal and agent literature.  The degree of risk 
aversion of the participating actors is assumed rather than derived from reality, though the 
relative importance of risk-aversion, i.e., which party is more risk-averse, is critical for the 
predictions of royalty types in the models.   
While theoretical formalization in the principal and agent framework was in 
progress, the notion of “transaction cost” depicted for sharecropping by Cheung (1969) was 
also elaborated in the sense of measurement cost (Barzel, 1982; Kenny and Klein, 1983).  In 
a sharecropped contract, output must be measured and divided, where a farmer has an 
incentive to underreport the harvest to the landowner, implying a high enforcement cost borne 
by the landowner to receive the pre-specified share (Allen and Lueck, 1992).  The 
measurement cost is not uniform among different crops, because some are weighed and 
graded by an independent party (Allen and Lueck, 1992, p.408) while others are not.  When 
measurement cost is high, efficiency improvement supplied by sharecropping (in terms of 
decreased distortion in factor inputs in the Allen and Lueck study) may be overridden.  
Indeed, it was found that crops with higher measurement cost tended to be on a cash-rent 
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basis, not on sharecropping.  In addition to the example from farming studies, there are other 
findings where measurement cost has important efficiency implications in contractual choices, 
such as in film distribution and in uncut diamond transactions (Kenny and Klein, 1983).  
This approach does not require the ad hoc assumptions about risk-aversion placed in the 
standard principal and agent models (Allen and Lueck, 1995, 1999).  Thus, whereas the 
principal and agent framework sophisticated the notion of private information under the 
existence of external shocks from natural forces, the cost of measurement per se was found to 
affect the efficiency of contractual choices.   
 
3. The framework and hypotheses  
3.1 Risk, private information, measurement cost, and patent citations  
The number of patent citations (in the sense of forward citation) to licensed patents 
may be associated with many of the aforementioned factors in the literature of share contracts, 
namely, risk, the value of patents to be signaled by licensors, entrepreneurial scope and efforts 
by licensees, moral hazards by both parties, and the cost of measuring the final output to be 
split.  I first consider the meanings of patent citations in relation to these issues.  I then 
draw some testable implications and establish hypotheses.   
Patent citation is assigned to U.S. patents when a previously granted patent 
represents a prior piece of knowledge for a patent.  Because of the characteristics of 
technological antecedents and descendents represented by citations, patent citations have been 
utilized for empirical studies on R&D spillover and/or knowledge flow (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
and Henderson 1993).  The uncertainty associated with a highly-cited patent is relevant to 
the entrepreneurial scope by licensees, as was indicated by Rao (1971).  When a licensed 
technology has great potential for further improvements and applications, a licensee has a 
wider scope of decision making in the choice of development objectives and in the allocation 
of resources for the development.  The preferences and choices made by a licensee are not 
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always observable by a licensor.  The room for private information implies the possibility of 
moral hazard, in the sense that a licensee may not make the “proper” endeavor to maximize 
joint profits of the licensee and the licensor.   
Not only a licensee but also a licensor has chances to keep some information private.  
For instance, a licensor, being usually an inventor as well, may have superior knowledge, 
compared to outside technology buyers, about the future potential of the technology.  The 
value and future path of the technology as private information may be signaled to a potential 
buyer, but the transmission cannot be complete before contracting due to the difficulty of 
trading information (Arrow, 1962).  Also, technology transfer often requires a long and 
costly process, and active participation by a licensor is sometimes indispensable for effective 
transfer of technology (Teece, 1976; Kogut and Zander, 1993).  Namely, collaborative efforts 
supplied by a licensor are necessary for the absorption of licensed technology as well as for 
the development and sales of products.  However, a licensor’s effort is only incompletely 
observable, and moral hazard is possible.  That is, the licensor may not make “proper” 
endeavor to maximize joint profits between the licensee and the licensor.   
In addition to risk and private information problems, measurement cost is pertinent, 
especially when a large number of citations are given to a licensed patent.  In short, the 
measurement cost of determining the royalty base is higher for a patent with a large number 
of forward citations, when running royalty is used.  In order to validate this argument, the 
nature of patent citation and the cost of litigation to determine infringement must be 
considered.   
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must show that her/his invention is 
innovatively different from relevant prior art, and the relevant prior art is acknowledged as 
patent citations (Meyer, 2000).  As a result, patent-to-patent citation delimits the scope of the 
claims of a patent in relation to the claims of its citing patent.  It means that citing patents, 
being close to the cited patent in technological space, may be substitutive or complementary 
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to their originating patent when the patents are actually commercialized.  However, statutory 
patent documents do not specify whether a citing patent is complementary or substitutive to 
its originating patent.  In other words, an inventor of a citing patent cannot officially 
determine whether the citing patent is “inventing around” the cited patent, or the citing patent 
is an “add-on” to the cited patent in commercialization.  Litigation is eventually needed to 
determine whether a product based on a patent is infringing another patent that is owned by 
another holder.  As recent evidence shows (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001) 
patent infringement litigation is very costly.   
Since running royalty is derived from a royalty rate applied to a royalty base (dollar 
of sales, or units sold of final products, in realized terms), the royalty base must always be 
specified and measured as long as running royalty is to be implemented.  On the other hand, 
if a licensed patent has many citing patents in a short period of time, the technological area to 
which the patent belongs experiences fast innovation.  It is likely that there are many new 
applications of the originating patent as well.  Each of a licensee’s new products must be 
examined to determine whether it is infringing the original patent or not – 
namely, whether it is a part of the royalty base or not.  However, it is also possible that a 
licensee no longer needs to pay for the original patent for newly released products, because 
they are based on substitutive technology.  Because the cost to determine the scope of 
infringing products concerning a patent is very high, and because a large number of citing 
patents suggest that a variety of potentially infringing and non-infringing products are 
emerging, the cost to determine the scope of the royalty base by way of litigation can be 
enormous when there are many citing patents.  With or without judicial procedure, a licensee 
tends to underreport the royalty base, whereas a licensor tends to overstate the scope of the 
royalty base.  Therefore, measurement cost over the royalty base becomes higher with the 
cost of haggling if a patent has many citations in a short period of time.  The cost of 
measurement increases rapidly as the number of citing patent increases, because potential 
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conflicts of infringement/non-infringement increase fast with the emergence of a number of 
new products and new patents.   
 
3.2 Hypotheses  
The argument above is that the problem of risk, moral hazard, hidden information, 
and measurement cost become more significant as forward citation counts to a patent increase.  
The way in which the increase of the number of citations influences the royalty structure is 
complex.  An individual contributing factor, such as “moral hazard effect,” cannot always be 
tested independently from another factor.  While it is impossible to test all of the individual 
predictions from risk-sharing theory or the principal-agent framework, it is possible to make 
gross predictions of the comparison between the measurement cost associated with the use of 
running royalty and the merit of using running royalty in terms of risk dispersion or of 
incentive adjustment perceived by the principal-agent framework.  The basis for the 
argument is that the measurement cost associated with running royalty increases fast with the 
increase of follow-up innovations.  As a result, the marginal merit from employing running 
royalty decreases with the increase of follow-up innovations, as will be argued below.  This 
is essentially an argument similar to the work by Cheung (1969) comparing the cost of 
measurement with “the gain from risk sharing.”   
First, it should be noted that the rate of running royalty in technology licensing is 
usually low.  Annual reports of technology importing contracts by the National Institute of 
Science and Technology repeatedly show that most running royalty rates in electronics and 
machinery industries are less than 5% of the final sales, and that running royalty rates 
exceeding 10% are rare, especially when software is not involved (NISTEP, 1987-2000).  
Also, another survey of domestic licensing in the U.S. shows that approximately 90% of 
running royalty rates are less than 5% in the automotive and computer industries (McGavock, 
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Haas, and Patin, 1993).3  The rate of running royalty is often negotiated according to the 
industry’s customary rate (McGavock, Haas, and Patin, 1993).  As a result, it is unlikely that 
firms can employ very different rates for individual licensing transactions, even if the extents 
of risk-aversion differ significantly.  Since the rate of running royalty is low in most cases, 
most of the variation in the sales is borne by licensees.  For instance, when the rate of 
running royalty is at 5%, a licensor faces only 5% of the variation of the sales, assuming that 
sales are the royalty base.  Thus, the licensor does not bear most of the variation.   
Even if it is possible to employ high royalty rates in some cases, it is impossible to 
insure both agents at once completely.  As far as bilateral contracts with running royalty are 
concerned, risks can be shifted from one party to the other, but the risk cannot be removed 
from both parties simultaneously.  For example, even when a transaction is expected to bear 
ten-fold variance compared to another, a high rate of running royalty such as 50% can only 
distribute the risk evenly to each party.  This means that both parties are not well-insured.  
The increase in risk should be borne by either party.  It means that the gain from running 
royalty in risk-dispersion does not increase linearly with the increase in external risk.  The 
marginal benefit to employing running royalty will be eventually decreasing, as overall risk 
increases to a significant level.  Namely, the gain from utilizing running royalty in terms of 
risk-dispersion will be limited when there is significant amount of risk.   
The gain from employing running royalty in order to induce a licensor to make an 
effort in the interest of its licensee, as the principal and agent framework formalizes, is also 
limited when external shocks become large.  It is true that a licensor is willing to support the 
absorption and commercialization of a technology by a licensee if running royalty is present, 
because the licensor has a stake in the amount of final sales.  Accordingly, running royalty 
                                                  
3 The survey results presented by McGavock, Haas, and Patin (1993) also indicate that the rate of 
running royalty is higher in the pharmaceutical and health-care equipment industry.  “Less than six 
out of every ten licenses for pharmaceutical and health-care equipment industry respondents were at 
royalty rates less than 5%.”  However, rates exceeding 10% are rare in these industries as well 
(McGavock, Haas, and Patin, 1993). 
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will be more likely to be used when moral hazard by a licensor is more important, holding all 
other conditions such as the significance of external shocks or the degree of risk-aversion 
constant.  However, the “incentive” assumed in the principal and agent framework has a 
basic trade-off between the power of incentive and the provision of insurance (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  When external shocks become very large, it is 
more difficult to give incentives for an agent (in the example here, it is the licensor) in the 
principal-agent model, given that the agent is risk-averse to some extent.  Intuitively, an 
agent will no longer be happy to make an effort when the outcome is largely determined by 
external shocks.  Thus, the marginal merit of using running royalty will be decreasing as 
external shocks become greater in the principal and agent framework.   
The same logic applies when running royalty is used for signaling the value of a 
technology prior to contracting.  Namely, a licensor is supposed to signal the value of a 
technology to a potential licensee by the use of running royalty where the potential licensee 
does not have the information, because the licensor has less incentive to misguide a licensee 
in that the actual amount of royalty is determined after the amount of sales is realized.  
However, as external shocks become greater, realized sales ex post are mostly determined by 
the external shocks, and the licensor finds little difference in outcome whether or not 
disclosing better knowledge about the probability of the success prior to contracting.   In 
either explanation, the gain from the use of running royalty critically rests on the share of 
variation in final sales that a licensor bears.  It means that any efficiency gain from using 
running royalty becomes less as external shocks become greater, according to the principal 
and agent framework.   
In comparison with the merit of using running royalty, the measurement cost of the 
royalty base increases rapidly with the increase of citations and related innovations, as argued 
in the previous section.  While the marginal merit of running royalty will be eventually 
decreasing, the marginal cost of measurement with the increase of follow-up innovations will 
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remain at least constant, or may be increasing.  This is because the number of potential 
conflicts with respect to the borders between patent claims rises with the increase of 
potentially substitutive and complementary patents, and because multiple relationships 
between patents and products will be more complex, as innovations are ongoing.  Therefore, 
as Cheung (1967) argued in sharecropping, the efficiency gain from share contracting will be 
eventually overridden by the increase in measurement cost.  Since fixed royalty contract is 
free from the measurement cost of royalty base, running royalty is expected to be less used 
with the increase of patent citations, assuming that patent citation is a proxy of measurement 
cost.  Summarizing the argument, the main hypothesis comes down to:  
 
H1: As the number of total forward-citations from a patent in the pre-licensing period 
becomes greater, it is more likely for the patent to be licensed without running royalty.   
 
In this hypothesis, citation before the licensing period is the focus in order to avoid 
the endogeneity problem with the number of post-contract citations.  Namely, running 
royalty may give an incentive to supply tacit knowledge for a licensor, because the licensor 
has a continuing stake.  Then, post-licensing citations may be influenced by the choice of 
royalty.   
It should be noted that the hypothesis above is not inconsistent with, but not the 
same as, alternative explanations from the principal-agent framework with an emphasis 
placed on moral hazard on the licensee side.  Namely, if the number of citations means the 
scope of entrepreneurial effort by a licensee (Rao, 1971), fixed royalty compares more 
favorably with running royalty from the viewpoint of moral hazard on licensees.  However, 
this argument not only makes ad hoc assumptions about the degree of risk aversion, but also 
presumes that the fruit of a licensee’s effort can be measured and divided without significant 
cost (since what is not measurable is the hidden action of a licensee).  Although the 
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prediction of the relationship between citations and the use of running royalty is the same, the 
logic is different.   
While the hypothesis predicts that the number of total citations is positively related 
with the measurement cost of the royalty base, it is difficult for the other party to argue 
against the scope of the royalty base if most of the citing patents are obtained by the original 
licensor.  In an extreme case, when a licensor of a patent has all of the citing patents, it will 
be easy to show that follow-up new products will continue to use the original patent, or the 
licensor’s substitutive patents.  Conversely, when a licensor obtains a smaller share of 
follow-up innovations, it may be more costly to measure the royalty base, ceteris paribus.  
The share of self-citations over total citations thus can be used as a proxy of the reduction in 
measurement cost.   
Also, how citing patents are distributed in the technology space may be another 
driver for measurement cost of the royalty base.  If a technological impact by a patent is 
diverse in technological space, it is unlikely that the citing patents are substitutive to the 
originating patent, because the citing patent is technologically different.  If a patent is not 
substitutive to an existing patent, a product using the prior patent continues to depend on it.  
Haggling over the royalty base is less likely to occur in this case than in other cases where 
there are many substitutive patents.  On the other hand, if citing patents are concentrated in 
the technological area that is close to the originating patent, it would be costly to determine 
whether the citing patents are substitutive or complementary.  Therefore, the measurement 
cost will be higher when citing patents are concentrated in a narrow range, rather than 
dispersed widely.  Running royalty will be less used when the measurement cost of the 
royalty base is higher.  In sum,   
 
H2: As the share of a licensor’s self-citations to total citations from a patent before licensing 
increases, or as technological diversity of citing patents before licensing increases, it is more 
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likely for the patent to be licensed with running royalty, ceteris paribus.   
 
4. The data  
The data on licensing contracts are taken from the files in the Japanese government, 
specifically the filing of technology importing contracts required by the Article 29 of the 
Foreign Exchange Law of Japan (1949 Law 228), which was effective until April 1998.4  
The licensing data have not previously been exploited for academic research.5  According 
to the regulation, residents of Japan (including foreign subsidiaries in Japan) must file with 
the government if they acquire patents, trademarks, and other intellectual property rights 
from abroad, or if they are licensed, or if contracts for teaching knowledge regarding 
business administration are made or changed.  The National Institute for Science and 
Technology Policy (NISTEP) has published a statistical summary of the data in Japanese 
language each year ("Analysis of Trends in Technology Imports").   
This paper uses licensing contracts and licensed patents data, which were recorded 
from the filings between 1988 and 1992.6  The domain was limited to the firm pairs 
between licensors in the U.S. and licensees in Japan, so that country-specific institutional 
environment such as patent law regimes is held constant.7  The number of patents in the 
sample is 1,378 (849 patents net of multiply licensed patents), which are found in 407 
contracts.  All observations are unilateral patent licensing, most of which are in electronics 
and machinery technologies.8  As is noted above, all cross-licensing contracts are excluded 
                                                  
4 The filing requirement was abolished except for limited fields of technologies (e.g., those 
concerning national security) in April 2000.   
5 There exists a previous study based on this data (Montalvo and Yafeh, 1994). 
6 The period was chosen primarily because patents being licensed were not required to be filed after 
April 1992, while most of the files prior to 1988 were not available.  NISTEP had published the 
statistical figures each year in detail (NISTEP, 1987-1999).  
7 Technology imports from the U.S. have by far the largest share in all technology imports to Japan.  
Within 3,175 agreements in total in 1991 fiscal year, U.S. accounted for 2,002 (63.1%) of the total, 
followed by the U.K. (213 agreements or 6.7%), France (205), Germany (170) and Switzerland (102).  
(NISTEP, “Analysis of Technology Imports,” 1998)  
8 According to NISTEP’s two-digit technology classification, codes from 40 to 53 are machinery, and 
codes from 60 to 71 are electronics.  376 out of 407 contracts of the sample are within this range.  
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from the sample, and all contracts between the firms with direct or indirect equity 
relationship are also excluded.  Thus, the observations consist only of pure unilateral 
licensing.   
The patent portfolio of the U.S. licensor firms and Japanese licensee firms is  
defined by consolidating subsidiaries.  Consolidation was conducted by “Who Owns 
Whom 1990” on the U.S. licensor side.  Toyo Keizai’s “Nihon no Kigyo Group (the 
corporate groups in Japan) 1990,” “Kaisha Shikiho (Quarterly reports of companies) 1990,” 
and “Kigyo Keiretsu Soran (Keiretsu lists) 1990” were utilized on the licensee side.   The 
patents that have been assigned to the subsidiaries of the sample firms were also searched 
through the database above, and were consolidated with the patent portfolio of the parent 
firms.9  All observations of parent-to-subsidiary licensing and subsidiary-to-parent 
licensing were excluded from the samples for this paper, since by definition the patent 
portfolio of a parent firm becomes identical with that of its subsidiaries.   
The focus is placed on the choice between fixed royalty versus running royalty, 
which are often used simultaneously.  Since running royalty is conditional on post-licensing 
sales, it is difficult to know the realized amount of royalty in the years after licensing.  In 
order to assess relative importance between fixed royalty component and running royalty 
component in a contract, it would be ideal if realized sales, royalty percentage (or charge per 
units, depending on the way running royalty is specified), and the amount of fixed royalty are 
all available as observed data.  However, there are no such data as realized sales.  Due to 
the limitation of the data, a three-category variable of pure fix royalty contract, pure running 
royalty contract, and the combination of fixed and running royalty components in a contract, 
                                                                                                                                             
Only 12 contracts  concern chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  All 407 contracts are licenses of 
manufacturing technologies.  
9 The patent portfolio of the subsidiaries may be managed separately from that of parent firms to 
some extent.  However, the focus of the paper is the knowledge assets of transacting firms, and the 
knowledge assets of a firm is better captured by the entire patent portfolio of the firm, rather than that 
of a single parent or a subsidiary.  This way of patent data construction follows recent studies 
(Mowery, Oxley, Silverman, 1996; Silverman, 1999).   
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is defined and used.  This variable is essentially a combination of two binary variables – 
whether fixed fee is charged or not, and whether running royalty is included or not.  I 
assume that the three-category choices are ordered, because pure running royalty (without any 
fixed royalty) is more sales-sensitive than the combination of fixed fee and running royalty, 
while this combination is more sales-sensitive than a pure fixed fee contract.  Namely, the 
three-category variable can be understood as representative of the degree of 
sales-sensitiveness.  However, it should be noted that the category of “fixed fee combined 
with running royalty” contains a variety in combination.  If the amount of fixed fee in a 
contract is very small, the contract is close to running royalty only.  Similarly, if the 
percentage of running royalty is very small, it is close to fixed fee.  Interpretation of this 
category thus needs particular attention.   
 
5. Methodologies for statistical tests  
I test the hypotheses above using a categorical dependent variable.  The 
three-category variable of pure fix fee contract, pure running royalty contract, and the 
combination of fixed and running royalty components in a contract, is the main dependent 
variable.  Specifically,  
 
FEE =     0  if the royalty is fixed royalty only10 
                          1  if the royalty includes both fixed sum and running royalty 
                          2  if the royalty is running royalty only 
 
The main hypothesis (H1) is that running royalty creates a large measurement cost of 
specifying royalty base when forward citations are many.  As the choice is made ex ante of 
contract, I basically take forward citations to the licensed patents before licensing as 
representing the general possibility of ex post non-contractible innovations by licensees.  
                                                  
10 This includes 8 contracts without any fee, which we categorize into fixed-fee-only licensing.   
16 
Namely, CITE_BFR_LY, the number of citations11 before the licensing year, is the main 
explanatory variable to be assessed.  Its predicted sign of coefficient is negative.   
The next hypothesis (H2) is concerned about the ratio of citing patents appropriated 
by the patent holder of an originating patent.  PSELF_BFR_LY is the measurement for a 
licensor prior to licensing time.  Its predicted sign is positive, because a higher share of 
citing patents appropriated by a licensor implies fewer measurement costs in using running 
royalty.  Also, HHI_CITE is the concentration of citing patents in IPC Class.  It is 
negatively correlated with the diversity of technological impact by the originating patent.  
The predicted sign is negative, because technologically concentrated citing patents will raise 
the cost of determining if citing patents are substitutive or complementary to the originating 
patent.   
Other explanatory variables are pertinent.  In particular, those variables that are 
expected to be significant as proxies for contractual hazards should be included.  Namely, 
TRDMRK, AP_LY, COS, and KNWHW, were used as explanatory variables.   
A patent licensing accompanied by trademark licensing is a complex transaction, 
and therefore it is likely to require more cost for measurement.  A contract level variable, 
TRDMRK, is derived from the NISTEP licensing database.  The variable takes the value 1 
when a patent is licensed along with trademark licensing.  The predicted sign of the 
estimated parameter is negative, since more measurement cost will lead to less use of running 
royalty.  The variable AP_LY indicates the age of the technology.  It means “years between 
application year of a patent and its licensing year.”  If the value for a patent is smaller, the 
patent is newer.  When a technology is old, the fruit out of it is more predictable (Davidson 
and McFetridge, 1984).  The predicted sign of AP_LY is positive.   
                                                  
11 Citing patents are counted in two “generations,” following Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe 
(1997).  That is, since a patent’s influence on subsequent innovation may go beyond direct citing of 
patents, it is better to quantify impacts on follow-up innovation by considering indirect effects, or 
citation to citations.  The (equally weighted) average of the number of direct citations and the 
number of “citations to citations” is used for econometric analyses.   
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Following Jaffe (1986), this study defines technological proximity between two 
firms by the cosine of the angle formed between two patent portfolio vectors.  More 
accurately, vectors of patent counts in each of 118 “Classes” of the International Patent 
Classification system (IPC) characterize a firm’s patent assets by the year 1990 (accumulated 
from 1975).  The cosine of two vectors is then given by the inner product divided by the 
product of norms of two vectors.  This measurement, named COS here, approaches to unity 
when two vectors are close to parallel, and equals to zero when two vectors are orthogonal.  
If transacting parties are within technological proximity, it is less costly for them to measure 
the royalty base.  Therefore, estimated coefficient on this explanatory variable is expected to 
be positive.   
Contract-level variable about whether or not explicit know-how transaction exists is 
also derived from the NISTEP licensing database.  This variable, KNWHW, is a dummy 
variable for know-how transfer, where the existence of know-how is defined by the regulation.  
Namely, the regulation requires firms to report know-how transfer only if their contract 
explicitly contains know-how transfer.  The “know-how” according to the regulation 
includes product manuals, procedure instructions, and software, which economists may not 
consider as know-how.  If the object of transfer is only tacit know-how, it is impossible to 
specify on a contract, and there is no obligation for it to be reported.  From the reasons 
above, this variable KNWHW is supposed to represent the existence of codified knowledge.  
If codified knowledge adds measurement cost, the parameter will be negative.   
In addition, some control variables are included.  The variables LSR_CAP 
(LicenSoR CAPital) and LSE_CAP (LicenSEe CAPital) are defined and used as firms size 
proxies.  The former is the size of U.S. licensor firm capital, expressed in dollars.  The data 
were derived directly from the filings with the Japanese government.  When a firm is 
involved in more than two contracts and the capital size data differs, arithmetic mean is used, 
while the size of a subsidiary licensor is measured by its parent firm.  LSE_CAP (LicenSEe 
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CAPital) is Japanese licensee firm capital size, expressed in millions of yen.  Toyo Keizai's 
"Nihon no Kigyo Group (Directory of Japanese firms and domestic subsidiaries) 1990" was 
used for this information instead of the filings with the government, because the data provided 
better consistency when a licensee firm and its subsidiaries were involved in more than two 
contracts.  In addition to the control variables for size, INDVNPFT, which represents 
non-commercial firm licensor (individuals, non-profits, universities, government 
organizations), is added where possible.  It is because the special types of licensors may 
behave differently from commercial firms, due to the possibility of different objective 
function (maximizing reputation instead of maximizing profit, etc.).   
Technological classifications are controlled by patent classification where possible.  
The international patent classification system assigns “section” to each patent as its top 
categories, and the sections in IPC ranges from A to H.  IPC_Xi (Xi: A-H) are dummies for 
the sections, and used for the patent-level tests.  Due to perfect prediction of the qualitative 
results in econometric tests, though, only sections of B, C, G, and H are controlled by the 
dummies.    
 With those variables, I test the hypotheses by the following discrete choice model, 
ordered PROBIT, with an assumption that the dependent variable is ordered.  The error term 
e is assumed to be normally distributed.   
 
Prob (FEE =0, 1, 2)  
= F (β0,  β1 CITE_BFR_LY,  β2 PSELF_BFR_LY,  β3 HHI_CITE, β4⋅ TRDMRK, 
β5⋅ AP_LY, β6⋅ COS, β7⋅ KNWHW,  CONTROLS, e )  
 
6. Results and discussion  
Table 3 shows the estimation results concerning H1 and H2 by way of ordered 
PROBIT.  Model 1 shows the result from ordered probit only with those variables being 
related to firm size and technology class.  LSR_CAP (licensor capital size) is found to be 
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positive and significant, and INDVNPFT (individual, non-profit or government licensor) is 
negative and significant.  When a licensor becomes bigger, it shares more risk by accepting 
running royalty.  On the contrary, individual and non-profit licensors seem to circumvent 
running royalty.  Since most of the observations INDVNPFT=1 are in fact individual 
licensors, both of the results are consistent with predictions from risk aversion.  Although 
significance is smaller than the two variables, LSE_CAP, the size of licensees, has a negative 
sign as predicted from the same reason.    
Model 2 adds TRDMRK, KNWHW, AP_LY, and COS.  TRDMRK has a 
coefficient with a negative and significant sign, which indicates that more measurement cost 
added by trademark licensing shifts royalty structure towards fixed fee and away from 
running royalty.  It suggests that there is a cost in measuring the sales that is contributed by 
the licensed brand name, and that the measurement cost works against the use of running 
royalty.  A positive and significant coefficient for COS is also consistent with the basic 
argument here, because as the proximity of technological assets increase between licensing 
firms, it is less hazardous in the sense of lowered measurement cost to use running royalty.  
Transfer of codified knowledge, or KNWHW, and the age of licensed patent, AP_LY, have 
insignificant results.   
Model 3 includes all explanatory variables.  The coefficients of CITE_BFR_LY,  
PSELF_BFR_LY, and HHI_CITE have signs as predicted by hypotheses.  A negative and 
significant coefficient for CITE_BFR_LY supports H1.  A positive and significant 
coefficient for PSELF_BFR_LY and a negative and significant coefficient for HHI_CITE12 
                                                  
12 However, the result with respect to HHI_CITE may require some caution, because it is one of 
Hirfindahl-type indices.  It is shown that HHI on citations is biased upwards when patents in 
question have few citations (Hall, 2001, in the Appendix of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001).  
Namely, a patent with few forward citations seems to have a more concentrated distribution than true 
distribution.  While running royalty is preferred for a patent with a small number of forward 
citations, those patents with a small number of citations may have a seemingly concentrated 
technological impact due to this bias, resulting in a seemingly positive relationship between the 
concentration of citing patents and the use of running royalty.  This is possible but not scrutinized 
here, and is a subject for further research.     
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support H2.  AP_LY also have an interesting result in Model 3 since older technology is 
more likely to be licensed with running royalty, though its statistical significance needs more 
scrutiny due to the insignificant result in model 2.     
 
7. Conclusion  
 I argue that fixed royalty is preferred to running royalty when the measurement cost 
of the royalty base used for running royalty is high.  Supportive evidence consistent with the 
argument is obtained, when other factors such as firm size are controlled.  Fixed royalty, 
which is free from haggling over the royalty base, is preferred when a patent licensing is 
subject to a large number of citing patents, and therefore a high measurement cost.   
The findings are supportive for transaction cost economics, in that measurement 
cost indeed plays an important role in patent licensing contracts, as was found in 
sharecropping (Allen and Lueck, 1995).  The results are also informative for the principal 
and agent framework, in that the use of running royalty is consistent with the assumption of 
risk-aversion.  The results does not imply that transaction cost economics and the 
game-theoretic principal-agent framework are mutually exclusive to each other.  Instead, 
transaction cost economics can shed light on an important cost which tends to be overlooked 
by orthodox microeconomics, including the principal-agent models.   
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Tables 
Table 1: Other variables  
Variables Description 
FEE Defined for a licensed patent as: 0 when a license uses fixed fee 
only, 1 when both fixed sum and running royalty are 
simultaneously used, and 2 when there is running royalty only.  
CITE_BFR_LY Total counts of citing patents (weighted in two generations) by 
any firm,  which are applied to the USPTO on or before 
Licensing Year 
PSELF_BFR_LY Ratio of self citations to total citations (weighted in two 
generations) before licensing year 
HHI_CITE Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated by the patents that cite 
a licensed patent (only citing patents that were applied on or 
before licensing year) based on IPC “Class” 
AP_LY Years between application year of a patent and its licensing year 
TRDMRK Dummy variable for trademark licensing along with patent 
licensing 
KNWHW Dummy variable for knowhow transfer (defined by the 
regulation) along with patent licensing 
COS Technological proximity between two firms by the cosine of the 
angle formed between two patent portfolio vectors based on IPC 
“Class” 
LSR_CAP LicenSoR CAPital: U.S. licensor firm capital, expressed in 
dollars.  
LSE_CAP LicenSEe CAPital: Japanese licensee firm capital, expressed in 
millions of yen. 
INDVNPFT Individuals and Non-Profits: dummy variable, 1 if licensor is 
individual, non-profits or government organizations 
IPC_B Dummy for International Patent Classification, Section B 
(Performing Operations ; Transporting) 
IPC_C Dummy for International Patent Classification, Section C, 
(Chemistry/Metallurgy) 
IPC_G Dummy for International Patent Classification, Section G 
(Physics) 
IPC_H Dummy for International Patent Classification, Section H 
(Electricity) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Sum 
FEE 0.876 0.683 0 2 1208
CITE_BFR_LY 21.36 49.04 0 542.5 29437
PSELF_BFR_LY 0.0893 0.186 0 1 123.066
HHI_CITE 0.610 0.312 0 1 840.868
AP_LY 9.28 4.68 1 29 12789
TRDMRK 0.0391 0.194 0 1 54
KNWHW 0.496 0.500 0 1 684
COS 0.458 0.237 0 0.99673 632.43504
LSR_CAP 1.101D+09 1.997D+09 10 1.64180D+10 1.5182D+12
LSE_CAP 109053.8 102488.9 927 780000 1.5027D+08
INDVNPFT 0.0740 0.261 0 1 102
IPC_B 0.0972 0.296 0 1 134
IPC_C 0.106 0.308 0 1 147
IPC_G 0.344 0.475 0 1 475
IPC_H 0.413 0.492 0 1 570
 
N=1378
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Table 3: Royalty choice and pre-contracting conditions 
Estimation method: Ordered Probit  
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Variable FEE FEE FEE 
CITE_BFR_LY   -.416E-02*** 
(-5.41) 
PSELF_BFR_LY   .835*** 
(4.86) 
HHI_CITE   -.352** 
(-3.35) 
TRDMRK  -.356* 
(-2.06) 
-.393* 
(-2.26) 
KNWHW  -.062 
(-.855) 
-.035 
(-.486) 
AP_LY  .752E-02 
(.984) 
.025** 
(3.13) 
COS  .473** 
(3.39) 
.455** 
(3.24) 
LSR_CAP .100E-09*** 
(6.34) 
.867E-10*** 
(5.20) 
.811E-10*** 
(4.82) 
INDVNPFT -.766*** 
(-5.88) 
-.867*** 
(-6.45) 
-.862*** 
(-6.31) 
LSE_CAP -.866E-06** 
(-2.80) 
-.770E-06* 
(-2.36) 
-.735E-06* 
(-2.23) 
IPC_B .334 
(1.79) 
.247 
(1.27) 
.275 
(1.41) 
IPC_C .611** 
(3.27) 
.464* 
(2.38) 
.537** 
(2.74) 
IPC_G -.081 
(-.483) 
-.210 
(-1.19) 
-.088 
(-.497) 
IPC_H .551** 
(3.30) 
.397* 
(2.25) 
.475 
(2.67) 
C .305 
(1.90) 
.216 
(1.04) 
.207 
(.973) 
Log likelihood -1287. -1275. -1245. 
 
N=1,378 
Estimated coefficients are in upper rows and t-values are in parentheses.   
* indicates significance at 0.05 level.  ** indicates significance at 0.01 level.  
 *** indicates significance at 0.001 level 
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ロイヤリティ形態選択における派生技術の計測費用 
 
 
要 旨 
 
 
本研究は、クロスライセンスなどの複雑なライセンスでなく、単純な一方向の特許ライ
センスにおいて、固定額ロイヤリティのみが用いられるか、それともランニング・ロイ
ヤリティも用いられるか、の決定要因を探ろうとするものである。とりわけ、ライセン
スされた特許の被引用数と、ロイヤリティ構造選択の関連に着目した。プリンシパル・
エージェント型の説明をとるならば、情報の非対称性やリスク許容度によってロイヤリ
ティ構造の選択を予想することになる。たとえば、被引用数が多い特許とは、ライセン
ス契約後のライセンシの（隠れた）努力余地が大きい特許だ、と仮定により見なすなら
ば、ライセンシへのインセンティブ増加のためランニング・ロイヤリティの比重を下げ、
固定額ロイヤリティに依存することがより合理的といえる。しかし、被引用数が多い特
許においては、ライセンサの契約後の技術援助努力も同時に重要になるのではないか、
あるいは、増大するリスクをシェアするためランニング・ロイヤリティを使うのではな
いか、といった批判がありうる。つまり、プリンシパル・エージェントの枠組みを使お
うとする限り、リスク許容度などに関する恣意的な仮定から逃れられない。そこで、農
作物に関する契約の実証研究にみられるように、成果の計測コスト（measurement cost）
に着目した。ランニング・ロイヤリティを使うためには、その算定基礎となる製品群（ロ
イヤリティベース）を特定することが必要になる。ライセンスされた特許の被引用数が
多くなるほど、引用特許とライセンス対象特許の補完性・代替性を決定することが煩雑
になり、ロイヤリティベースの決定に大きな費用がかかると考えられる。したがって、
その計測コストがあまりにも高くなるときには、ランニング・ロイヤリティによる他の
効率性向上効果が相殺されるので、固定ロイヤリティのみを使う確率が高まると予想さ
れる。日米技術導入データに基づいて実証的に検証したところ、ライセンス対象の特許
の被引用数が多いほど、ランニング・ロイヤリティが使われないことがデータ上明らか
に観察された。つまり、計測コストがロイヤリティ選択に影響しているという理解と整
合的であった。特許の被引用数の多さは一般に特許の価値の高さを示すと理解されてい
るが、継続的に派生技術が生まれることにより、ライセンス対象の成果計測コストを上
昇させるという理解が可能であろう。 
 
